Empirical Methods in Comparative Law: Data Talks

Abstract

Why does a comparativist need empirical legal studies? Isn’t it better to leave the numerical operations to a
statistician? Comparative law has been a customary tool for generations of legal scholars, with a perspective
focused not only on the study of the law but also on the history, social events, language, and culture of the
system under study. However, this holistic comparative approach refrains from using empirical methodology in
a refined functionalist fashion.
This article illustrates how comparative law would benefit from the scientific method to bolster its reliability
when comparing legal systems. The scientific method is extrinsic to the legal field but can be used to gain a
better understanding of the law. To attain this result, the use of empirical methods in law requires a jurist
who can handle these methodologies—someone who can harmoniously interpret the data according to legal
theory.
The question is no longer: Why compare? Or What should we compare? But How to compare? This article
provides an excursus of the different movements in the U.S. legal scenario that influenced the development of
empirical legal studies. Empirical legal methodology’s departure from Law and Economics traces how these
extrinsic methods are widely applied in social sciences (and increasingly in law) but scarcely advanced in
comparative law.
Finally, the paper focuses on different types of quantitative empirical legal research and methods used in legal
studies and how they can be connected to comparative law. It concludes by identifying the limitations of this
methodology as applied to comparative law and previewing a future of combined methods.