Giuliana Giuseppina Carboni


This paper aims to set a general framework within which a study on fiscal federalism could be developed. The term “fiscal federalism” stems from American economic schools. The natural tendency of economic science to cross national boundaries allowed fiscal federalism theory to spread to all liberal-democratic States and affect legal studies. The legal analysis of fiscal federalism concerns rules that regulate the allocation of economic and financial powers between layers of government to understand how these powers achieve common values. The interaction between principles of fiscal federalism and sources of law gives rise to a plural system of fiscal intergovernmental relations, which can be ordered into different patterns or models. Some States protect territorial autonomy more than equality, but others guarantee equal conditions for citizens more than a differentiation of territories. The choice between equality and territorial autonomy depends on the social Constitution. In fact, the coordination between taxing and spending, which are both related to equalisation, is essential for the realisation of the welfare State.

From a comparative law perspective, the study of the balance of powers highlights the conditions and limits of the fiscal constitution, which, in conjunction with an institutional context, defines the constitutional field of fiscal federalism.

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Comparative Law Review is registered at the Courthouse of Monza (Italy) - Nr. 1988 - May, 10th 2010.
Editors - Prof. Giovanni Marini, Prof. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Prof. Tommaso Edoardo Frosini, Prof. Salvatore Sica, Prof. Alessandro Somma, Prof. Giuseppe Franco Ferrari.

Direttore responsabile:Alessandro Somma